درخت حوزه‌های تخصصی

The future of philosophy and the future of humankind-in-the-world are intimately related, not only (i) in the obvious sense that all philosophers are “human, all-too-human” animals—i.e., members of the biological species Homo sapiens, and also finite, fallible, and thoroughly normative imperfect in every other way too—hence the natural fate of all human animals is also the natural fate of all philosophers, but also (ii) in the more profound and subtle sense of what I’ll call philosophical futurism. Philosophical futurism is a critical, synoptic, and speculative reflection on the fate of humankind-in-the-world, with special attention paid not only to what humankind-in-the-world (including philosophy itself) will most likely be, if things continue to go along in more or less the same way as they have been and are now going, or could conceivably be, as in science fiction or other forms of imaginative projection, but also to what what humankind-in-the-world (including philosophy itself) ought to be, and therefore (assuming that “ought” entails “can”) can be, as the direct result of our individual and collective free agency, for the purpose of rationally guiding humankind in the near future. In my essay, I very briefly present, defend, and strongly recommend a version of philosophical futurism that I call Kantian futurism.

What is the state of democracy today? In the Western world, people often take the meaning of this term for granted, but do they genuinely know what democracy is? In this sense, how can we define democracy in today’s digitalized world? What is the relationship between democracy and information? Furthermore, do we really live in a democratic world? In Infocracy: Digitalization and the Crisis of Democracy—the 2022 translation of the original German book Infokratie. Digitalisierung und die Krise der Demokratie, published in 2021 by MSB Matthes & Seitz Berlin Verlagsgesellschaft mbH—Byung-Chul Han reflects on these and other related issues. Han’s analysis of the current political, social, and technological situation indicates that a profound democratic crisis is emerging. The loss of interest in truth, the end of grand narratives, the replacement of reason with data analysis (even in philosophy), the fragmentation of the population due to digitalization, and the predominant role of information in everyday life are all symptoms of a radical transformation underway in Western society, with severe consequences for democratic stability. In these terms, Han’s vision, at times excessively pessimistic, orients us on the crucial issues of our time.

The paper concentrates on the philosophical discourses of four thinkers – Soren Kierkegaard, M. K. Gandhi, R. D. Ranade and B. R. Ambedkar on Ethics and Religion. Soren Kierkegaard, whose journey in philosophy made him pass through the aesthetic stage to ethical stage and ultimately religious stage landing in the realm of “faith”; where an individual arrives at without any rational commitment. M. K. Gandhi, whose journey in life encompassed politics, economics, and social realms where the underlying paradigm has always been religion. He did not consider ‘truth’ and therefore ‘morality’ as segregated from religion. R. D. Ranade, while mentioning the criteria of mystical experience, very empathetically mentions that a mystic (a saint) has the element of universality, is intellectual, emotional, has the intuitive experience of ‘spiritual realization’ and cannot be devoid of morality. B. R. Ambedkar, instead of accepting Christianity or Islam, consecrated into Buddhism; that befitted Indian contextual situation critiquing the popular Brahmanism, believed that religion must be in amalgamation and consonance with reason and scientific temperament. And this criterion was fulfilled by Buddhism (indeed with other criteria).  His adopting Buddhism was more of a political movement rather than spiritual; therefore, his Buddhism in the transformed format, is called Neo-Buddhism. The research article concludes by comparing these masters’ views and ideologies in the context of ‘a possibility of ethical religion’ that has appealed my conscience. 

Developing the empirical method based on observation and experiment, Alhazen is considered the greatest Muslim physicist and the most significant figure in the history of optics between antiquity and the seventeenth century. Inventing a camera obscura, Alhazen rebuilt our conception of eyesight. His theory of vision was enormously prominent and much of our understanding of optics and light is based upon his groundbreaking discoveries. He began his criticism of emission by describing what happens when people are exposed to bright lights. No matter what the light source, the effect of bright lights was always the same. What this indicates to Alhazen is that light entering into the eye from an external source had some serious function in eyesight. Respecting observation, experiment and empirical method, Suhrawardi, the father of Illumination School, argues all theories of vision and rejects them just by mere reasoning. Suhrawardi validates his own Illuminationist method by scientists’ empirical method. So, I will argue, he is not to deny empirical aspect of Alhazen’s theory of vision. In an allegory, I will use the camera, representing the whole process of a human vision, while I use “beyond camera” for the embodiment that allows for the unfolding of a human soul’s position in the process of vision. What Alhazen is speaking of, we might call the process within the camera; while what Suhrawardi is speaking of, we could name the process behind the camera.

Drawing upon the hermeneutic basis that understanding and interpretation of a text is conditioned by the reader’s preunderstanding, this article examines ʾAllamah Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s interpretive preunderstandings. In so doing, the article first, will explore ʾAllamah’s constitutive and non-constitutive preunderstandings. As the foundation of his Qur'anic interpretation, the constitutive category is divided into three subcategories: text-specific, interpreter-specific, and interpretation-specific. The non-constitutive category is studied under the following two subcategories: the imposed and non-imposed preunderstandings. Although the article studies ʾAllamah Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s interpretive preunderstandings, this categorization can be applied in studying any scriptural hermeneutic discourse. The contribution of this article to the field, is not limited to Allamah Ṭabāṭabāʾī’s interpretive preunderstandings. The method applied in this study can be used in the study of any scriptural hermeneutics.

Contemplation and theoretical reflections on the "tongue under control" and how it operates, or the reasons and factors that prevent humans from exercising control, are among the most important topics studied by Islamic scholars. This research seeks to elucidate the philosophical foundations of "tongue under control" with an emphasis on the viewpoint of Allameh Javadi Amoli, using a descriptive-analytical approach and through a library method and referencing their numerous works. Based on such an approach, Allameh Javadi considers the fundamental factor in "tongue under control" to be the spiritual faculties(habits). The novelty of this research lies in the enumeration and explanation of the philosophical foundations of the discussion. Therefore, by employing Quranic verses and the principles of Sadra'i wisdom, such as substantial motion, bodily manifestation of the soul, and the explanation of the embodiment and manifestation of actions on the Day of Resurrection; he has identified the repetition and continuity of actions and their transformation into "habits" as the fundamental factor in the issue of "tongue under control"; in fact, "tongue" is not in our control, but rather in the control of the "habits" Therefore, if piety governs human actions, humans can to a large extent take control of their tongue in the world and in a wakeful state. However, in the world of dreams, near death, and also on the Day of Resurrection, the "tongue" is under the control of habits and temperaments, not us. 

Adopting a hermeneutic approach and horizontal and vertical interpretation methods, this study primarily explores the metaphysical concept of love-induced mystic intoxication in the Iranian polymath Mullā Muḥsin Fayḍ Kāshānī’s mystic poetry. Secondarily, it discusses the implications of mystic intoxication in the meaning of life. Furthermore, the paper briefly positions Fayḍ Kāshānī’s account in the contemporary categories of the meaning of life: supernaturalism, naturalism, and nihilism. Additionally, elucidating the perspectives of the contemporary philosopher John Cottingham, the paper examines Kāshānī’s view through Cottingham’s philosophy. Central to Kāshānī’s poetry, ignited by divine love, the spiritual seeker transcendends their self, getting absorbed into the Divine to the point where they become unaware of their self. This epistemic unawareness is mastī (intoxication) or bīkhudī (selflessness)—which, for Kāshānī, has profound implications on life’s meaning. Unlike the “extreme God-centric” view—which situates the purpose of life solely in fulfilling God’s purpose—Kāshānī’s “moderate God-soul-centric supernaturalist” view recognizes that while divine love, intoxication, and knowledge infuse more profound depth to the meaning of life, other aspects also add to the meaning in life—like the simpler forms of piety and everyday existence. A framework in which morality is instrumental. Similarly, for Cottingham, life has value and meaning beyond solely fulfilling God’s purpose. Nevertheless, while basic pleasures and desires might independently exist and have meaning, higher elements like moral virtue, crucial to life’s meaning, are contingent on God’s purpose.