بررسی دیدگاه فیلسوفان مسلمان پیرامون خودگرایی روانشناختی (ذاتی) (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
خودگرایی روانشناختی به این معنا است که غایت تمام افعال انسان، خودش است و محال است انسان کاری را ذاتاً به هدف رساندن نفعی به دیگران انجام دهد. در این مقاله اثبات می شود قاعده «بازگشت غایت به فاعل» که فیلسوفان مسلمان پذیرفته اند، به نوعی پذیرش خودگرایی روانشناختی است. سپس در مرحله بعد این دیدگاه، نقد و روشن می شود گرچه غایت بسیاری از کارهای انسان، نفعی است که به خودش می رسد (نفع دنیوی یا اخروی)، به لحاظ عقلی، انجام کاری ذاتاً به هدف دیگران را نمی توان محال عقلی دانست. درباره خداوند نیز می توان خودگرایی و دگرگرایی ذاتی را به این معنا مطرح کرد که آیا غایت تمام افعال خداوند ذاتش است یا اینکه ممکن است خداوند فعلی را به غایتی غیر از ذاتش انجام دهد. بر اساس این معنا، در این مقاله تبیین می شود فیلسوفان مسلمان نوعی خودگرایی ذاتی را نسبت به خداوند قبول کرده اند و بر این اساس، غایت فعل الهی را اصالتاً ذات الهی دانسته اند. این انگاره نیز در این مقاله، تبیین و بدین صورت نقد شد که هرگز محال نیست فعل خداوند غایتی خارج از ذات داشته باشد که نفع آن ذاتاً به مخلوقات برسد. این مقاله با روش تحلیلی - انتقادی، دیدگاه فیلسوفان مسلمان درباره خودگرایی ذاتی (روانشناختی) درباره خدا و انسان را تبیین و بررسی و نقد می کند.Examining the Views of Muslim Philosophers about Psychological (Intrinsic) Egoism
Psychological egoism means that all human actions are done for the purpose of his own benefit and it is impossible for a person to do something only for the purpose of benefiting others. In this study, it is proved that the rule of "returning the purpose to the subject" accepted by Muslim philosophers is a kind of acceptance of psychological egoism. Then, in the next stage, this view is criticized and it is clarified that although the purpose of many human actions is the benefit that comes to himself (worldly or hereafter benefit), doing something only for the purpose of others cannot be considered logically impossible. In the case of God, although attributing the "ego" to God is not correct, it is possible to propose a kind of intrinsic egoism and intrinsic altruism regarding the divine nature. Based on this meaning, in this research, it is explained that Muslim philosophers have accepted a kind of intrinsic egoism concerning God, and based on this, they have considered it impossible for God to do something intrinsically to bring good and benefit to creatures. This idea is also explained in this study and it is criticized in such a way that it is never impossible that the act of God has a purpose outside of the essence that benefits only the creatures.
Keywords: Psychological Egoism, Psychological Altruism, the Purpose of Divine Action, the Purpose of Actions.
Introduction
The purpose of this study is to investigate psychological egoism and psychological altruism from the perspective of Muslim philosophers. Although none of the Muslim philosophers have directly addressed this issue, it seems that one of the principles they accepted and used is the ultimate goal always refers back to the agent and implies a form of acceptance of psychological egoism. Acceptance of this principle means that all the actions of individuals are aimed at a benefit that ultimately returns to themselves, and people, by their very nature, cannot perform an action inherently with the goal of benefiting others.
This principle is also discussed in relation to the goal-oriented nature of God's actions. Although it is clear that God does not have a psyche, by considering the essence of God, two viewpoints emerge between the theologians defending the justice of God and Muslim philosophers. Both groups agree that the necessity of divine wisdom entails the creation of the world and its creatures. The point of difference, however, is that the theologians believe divine wisdom requires God to perform actions whose benefit is solely directed to the creatures. This theory contrasts with the view of philosophers, who argue that it is impossible for God to perform an action inherently aimed at the benefit of creatures. The study will demonstrate that this view of the theologians (which contrasts with the perspective of Muslim philosophers) can be seen, in a certain sense, as a form of intrinsic altruism concerning God.
Materials and Methods
This research employs a qualitative methodology, utilizing an analytical-critical approach to examine the writings of prominent Muslim philosophers, such as Mulla Sadra, Allameh Tabatabai, and Shahid Sadr. The analysis involves a comprehensive review of philosophical texts and relevant literature concerning psychological egoism and altruism. Key themes are identified and synthesized to highlight the philosophical arguments surrounding the nature of human actions. Data are collected from primary and secondary sources, ensuring a thorough understanding of the subject matter. The methodology is designed to facilitate a critical evaluation of the philosophical positions and their implications for understanding human motivation.
Research Findings
The findings of the study showed that Muslim philosophers predominantly endorse a form of psychological egoism, arguing that all human actions are ultimately self-directed. For instance, Allameh Tabatabai (1983) asserts that even acts of charity are motivated by a desire to alleviate personal discomfort upon witnessing suffering. Conversely, some theologians argue for the possibility of genuine altruism, suggesting that actions can be performed for the benefit of others without self-interest. Additionally, the analysis highlights a philosophical tension between these views, indicating that while self-interest may often guide actions, there exists a conceptual space for altruistic motivations under specific conditions.
Discussion of Results and Conclusion
Psychological egoism, in relation to human beings, is incompatible with the internal perceptions and intuitions of humans. Although in many cases a person takes into account the benefit they will gain from their actions, there are instances where a person realizes that they can perform an action inherently to benefit others. Therefore, psychological altruism is logically possible, even though the actions a person undertakes based on altruism may be fewer. In this regard, the statement by Muslim philosophers that all human actions are motivated by self-interest lacks a strong foundation, because, although in many cases a person considers their own benefit, there are times when they may not take this benefit into account.
Regarding God, it can be argued that the view of philosophers who believe it is impossible for God to perform an action for the benefit of others is not acceptable. Rather, it can be said that although the perfection of the divine essence necessitates the creation of beings and the bestowing of good upon them, this perfect essence has eternally willed to bring good to its creatures. There is no doubt that the essence and perfection of God necessitate the delivery of good to the creatures. However, accepting this does not contradict the truth that God performs actions for the benefit of creatures, because, contrary to the mindset of Muslim philosophers, performing an act for the benefit of others does not imply that the agent (God) receives any benefit or becomes more complete.
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