بررسی و نقد علیِّت از پایین به بالا در تفسیر اراده آزاد با تکیه بر رویکرد غیرتقلیل گرایی (مقاله علمی وزارت علوم)
درجه علمی: نشریه علمی (وزارت علوم)
آرشیو
چکیده
در تصویر تقلیل گرایان، انسان موجودی کاملاً فیزیکی در نظر گرفته می شود و به همین دلیل، رفتارهای او باید تابع قوانین طبیعت باشند؛ ازاین رو، این نگرش به این نتیجه می رسد که انسان نمی تواند آزاد، مختار و اخلاقاً مسئول باشد. مسئله اراده آزاد در تفسیر تقلیل گرایان عمدتاً مبتنی بر زیست شناسی اعصاب است و نگرش آنها بر پایه علیت از پایین به بالا شکل می گیرد؛ اما آیا واقعاً رفتارهای انسان کاملاً متعین به قوانین فیزیک یا زیست شناسی اعصاب اند. در این مقاله، تلاش شده است با نگاهی توصیفی تحلیلی و از منظر رویکرد غیر تقلیل گرایانه، به بررسی و نقد علیت از پایین به بالا در تفسیر اراده آزاد پرداخته شود. هدف از این بررسی، نشان دادن ناکافی بودن این نظریه در تبیین اراده آزاد و همچنین، ارائه راهی برای اثبات اراده آزاد انسان ازطریق دیدگاه کل گرایانه نسبت به انسان، علیت نزولی و نوخاسته گرایی خودفرمانی است. با این رویکرد، می توان استدلال کرد انسان به عنوان موجودی پیچیده و دارای ابعاد مختلف، قادر به انتخاب و عمل آزادانه است و این آزادی به سادگی به قوانین فیزیک و زیست شناسی تقلیل پذیر نیست.An Examination and Critique of Bottom-Up Causation in the Interpretation of Free Will, Focusing on the Non-Reductionist Approach
In the reductionist view, humans are considered entirely physical beings, and therefore, their behaviors must be subject to the laws of nature. Consequently, this perspective concludes that humans cannot be free, autonomous, or morally responsible. The issue of free will, according to reductionists, is primarily based on neurobiology, and their approach is grounded in bottom-up causation. However, are human behaviors truly fully determined by the laws of physics or neurobiology? This study aims to examine and critique bottom-up causation in the interpretation of free will through a descriptive-analytical approach and from the perspective of a non-reductionist approach. The goal of this analysis is to demonstrate the insufficiency of this theory in explaining free will and to offer a path to affirming human free will through a holistic view of humans, top-down causation, and the emergent self-governance theory. With this approach, it can be argued that humans, as complex beings with multiple dimensions, are capable of making free choices and acting autonomously, and this freedom cannot be simply reduced to the laws of physics and biology.Keywords: Non-reductionism, Free Will, Reductionism, Bottom-up Causation, Top-down Causation, Emergentism. IntroductionThe text delves into the philosophical debate surrounding reductionism and free will, tracing the origins of reductionist thought to ancient Greek philosophers, notably Leucippus and Democritus, who proposed that matter is composed of indivisible atoms. This atomic theory laid the groundwork for later philosophical and scientific inquiry. The study contrasts reductionism with the concept of free will, asserting that free agents can influence their surroundings through thoughtful decision-making.Key figures in this discourse include Harris, a staunch advocate of determinism, who argues that free will is incompatible with natural laws, positing that human desires and actions are ultimately products of prior causes beyond conscious control. Conversely, Dennett (1984) presents a more nuanced view, suggesting that free will can coexist with scientific understanding. He emphasizes the importance of deliberation, choice, and moral responsibility, arguing that free will is not only possible but essential for ethical accountability.The study aims to scrutinize the reductionist perspective on free will and to examine critiques from non-reductionist philosophers. It ultimately advocates for a more integrated understanding of human agency, suggesting that acknowledging the complexities of free will can enrich our comprehension of moral responsibility and the human condition. This exploration emphasizes the necessity of reconciling scientific insights with philosophical inquiries into the nature of free will and human autonomy. Materials and MethodsThis study employs a qualitative research design to investigate the interplay between reductionism and free will as understood by key philosophers. Primary materials include scholarly articles, philosophical texts, and contemporary analyses of reductionist theories, sourced from databases such as JSTOR and Google Scholar.Participants in the study include notable philosophers, whose views on free will and reductionism have significantly influenced contemporary discourse. A purposive sampling method was utilized to select texts that encompass a range of perspectives, including those of Sam Harris and Daniel Dennett.Data collection involved a systematic literature review, focusing on published works from the last two decades to ensure relevance. Key themes were extracted through thematic analysis, allowing for a nuanced understanding of the arguments for and against reductionism in relation to free will.To enhance the rigor of the analysis, triangulation was employed by comparing different philosophical positions and synthesizing insights from various texts. Additionally, peer feedback from academic colleagues was sought to validate interpretations and strengthen the overall argument.The findings will be presented through a narrative synthesis that highlights the contrasting views on free will and reductionism, ultimately contributing to the ongoing philosophical debate on human agency. Research FindingsThis study critically evaluates upward causation in the interpretation of free will through a non-reductionist lens. Our analysis reveals that reductionists, relying on physical and neurological laws, often view free will as an illusion or, at best, a semblance of free will. We found that this perspective necessitates a fundamental reassessment of free will: if reductionism holds true, human free will is non-existent, leading to a deterministic framework.Our examination of philosophical literature and contemporary critiques highlights the shortcomings of reductionist arguments regarding human agency. Notably, the idea that one cannot exercise free will is challenged by the everyday necessity of presuming free will during decision-making. For instance, when faced with choices such as ordering coffee or lemonade, the assumption of free will becomes essential; to suggest that one’s choice is merely a product of predetermined neural pathways undermines the very act of decision-making.Furthermore, we argue that reductionism detrimentally impacts both free will and higher human capacities, including rationality. Our findings suggest that a holistic approach—considering top-down causation—affirms that human behavior can reflect an exercise of control over neural processes, allowing for a genuine experience of free will that transcends mere biological determinism. Thus, embracing non-reductionism provides not only a coherent account of free will but also a foundation for moral responsibility.Discussion of Results and ConclusionsWe classified physicalism into two branches: reductionism and non-reductionism. Reductionist physicalism posits that humans are nothing more than their physical bodies, and all mental phenomena, including will, are linked to the body. The problem with this type of physicalism is that it negates the potentials and functions attributed to the soul. In contrast, non-reductionist physicalism does not adhere to such a notion; instead, it seeks to prove that all potentials are dependent on the body in relation to the world, culture, environment, and God.Non-reductionists believe that a serious challenge faced by reductionists is how to understand free will and moral responsibility. Reductionists argue that if humans are physical beings, their behavior must be determined by the laws of nature; thus, humans cannot possess free will or moral responsibility.In this study, we aimed to critique reductionism from the perspective of non-reductionist physicalists. Non-reductionists have presented arguments against causal reductionism, fundamentally undermining the reductionist notion of bottom-up causation, and have subsequently defended top-down causation. Moreover, non-reductionists, considering the differences between humans and other animals, from simple to complex, strive to demonstrate self-agency by combining these capacities, portraying humans as self-directed beings whose behaviors reflect top-down causal control over their neural systems.Non-reductionists place significant emphasis on human reason, as they do not regard humans merely as biological robots or machines, unlike some reductionists like Dennett. They argue that if reductionism were true, no rational person would exist. As we elaborated in detail, according to non-reductionists, if cognitive processes are well-developed and language—an essential element in human cognitive growth—empowers them, while also interacting with the social environment, they create potentials that enable humans to evaluate and assess their behaviors and to lean toward specific goals. In some cases, these re-evaluations of goals may lead to changes in them, guiding human behavior toward rationality, freedom, and ethics.Furthermore, humans take moral responsibility for their actions. It is not the neural networks that control individuals. Contrary to reductionists like Harris, who view neurons as the primary determinants of human activities and regard mental phenomena such as free will as mere illusions reducible to neural processes, humans are aware of the reasons behind their actions and evaluate them using language. Due to evolutionary development, humans can reflect on themselves and create opportunities for reorganization when confronted with new ideas and beliefs. Ultimately, based on their relative sense of freedom, humans take responsibility for their actions concerning their environment and other conditions.
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